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This paper challenges the view that legal rights are not important in affecting
whether people divorce, but it puts as much emphasis on property rights
(given, for example, by the law on alimony) as on dissolution rights. The paper
sets out two stylised models of marriage and examines the consequences of
fuller compensation for economic sacrifices made during marriage. If the
dominant economic issue in a marriage is who undertakes household tasks
then a law giving fuller compensation makes divorce more likely. If the
dominant issue is child custody, divorce is less likely.
Keywords: Marriage, Divorce, Property Rights, Household Production, Child
Custody1
What is the effect of the law on the incidence of divorce, and to what extent
has the liberalisation of divorce laws over the last thirty years been
responsible for the dramatic rise in marital dissolution? As some US states
have begun to consider repealing the no-fault legislation of the 1970s, and as
the UK continues to change its divorce laws, these questions lie at the heart of
the public policy debate on the effects and desirability of divorce reform.
The economic approach to this problem starts by recognising that
divorce law confers certain rights regarding marital dissolution, and it treats
these as property rights in the marriage; see, for example, Becker (1991),
Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977), and Peters (1986). A law that allows
unilateral divorce thus has a very different disposition of rights than one
requiring mutual consent. But whether this makes any difference to the
incidence of divorce has been challenged by the following argument. Suppose
it is the husband who wishes to divorce; if his gain from divorce is large then
under a mutual consent law he may be able to compensate his wife so that
after a divorce they would both be better off. In effect the wife has sold her
right to the marriage. Thus divorce occurs under mutual consent if there is a
potential for both partners to be better off, perhaps after a suitable transfer
that would form part of the divorce settlement. Under a unilateral law, if the
husband's gain from divorce is small and the wife's loss is great, then she may
be able to compensate her husband for not seeking a divorce. They would
then both be better off than had they divorced. In effect the husband has sold
his right to divorce, his compensation being some change in the way the
marriage is conducted. The conclusion is that whether divorce occurs or not
depends not on the law, but on the relative magnitude of the gains and losses
of divorce.
Attempts to test whether divorce law affects divorce rates have
produced mixed results. Using U.S. cross section data, Peters (1986, 1992)
finds the law to be neutral. Her results have been criticised by Allen (1990,
1992), mainly on the grounds that she misclassified some states as having
fault-based laws. Using U.S. panel data, Zelder (1993) and Friedberg (1997)
find a positive impact on divorce rates of the change to a unilateral law,2
whereas Smith (1997), using U.K. time series data, finds that rules of legal
procedure are important, but not the change from fault to no-fault. Overall, the
empirical evidence has not been decisive.
This paper looks at the theoretical basis for a relationship between
divorce law and divorce incidence. I argue that there is no basis for the
argument that the law necessarily has no effect on the incidence of divorce,
but this does not imply that couples are missing mutually beneficial trades or
that economic efficiency is compromised. I also emphasise other aspects of
the law apart from the right to dissolve a marriage. How assets and resources
are allocated within a marriage, and on dissolution, plays a central role in the
analysis. These two branches of the law define resource rights that determine
the gains and losses from divorce, and these rights are also important in
determining whether divorce occurs.
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section I provides
a brief discussion of how family law defines some of the property rights
alluded to above, with some concrete examples, drawn mainly from Scots law.
Section II sets up a formal economic model of property rights and distribution
within marriage and after divorce. In Section III two stylised models of
marriage are used to analyse compensation for economic sacrifices made in
marriage, and child custody. Section IV concludes.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FAMILY LAW
I.1 Dissolution Rights
Scots law has allowed divorce since the Reformation, but until 1976, it was
based almost exclusively on some idea of fault: adultery, desertion, or, since
1938, cruelty, sodomy, or bestiality. Since the Divorce (Scotland) Act of 1976,
the only ground for divorce has been the irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage, which must be proved by at least one of five "facts": adultery;
unreasonable behaviour; desertion; two years separation if both partners3
consent to divorce; five years separation if one partner wishes to divorce. The
last fact allows for unilateral divorce, the main innovation of the 1976 act.
Fault-based divorce is often held to be identical with divorce requiring
mutual consent, on the grounds that in a fault-based system divorce can only
happen if one spouse commits a fault (presumably in full knowledge of the
possible legal consequences) and the other brings an action at law. Similarly,
the absence of a fault requirement is almost invariably identified with unilateral
divorce, although there is no reason why a dissolution law should be unilateral
if and only if it is a no-fault law. For our purposes the important issue is
whether one partner can withhold consent to a divorce or not, and this is the
criterion by which the paper assesses past and prospective legal reforms,
even if they are couched in the language of fault.
I.2  Resource Rights Within Marriage
The title to a physical or financial asset may belong to one or both partners,
and it can be transferred from one partner to another. Who has the right to
such property when a couple disagree on how it should be used depends on
the current state of the law relating to marital property. This law differs
between countries, and has changed over time. In Scotland before the
Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act of 1881, a wife had no right to her
own moveable property, such as money or furniture, even if she had earned it
or inherited it (an exception was so-called paraphernalia such as dresses and
jewellery). Until the passing of the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act
of 1920, heritable property such as land or a house, even though owned by
the wife, was controlled by the husband. Broadly speaking, Scots law now
applies the same property law to spouses as to any two people, so that a
wife's earnings are her own property. If the title to the matrimonial home is in
the husband's name, then he owns the home, and can sell it. His wife cannot
prevent the sale, although she may have a claim on the proceeds and may
still have a right to occupy the house. Indeed, the husband can be excluded4
from his own house if there is a risk of danger to his wife or a child of the
family (Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981).
These examples of property law show dramatic changes in the
disposition of property rights within marriage over the course of a century:
from having virtually absolute control over family resources, a husband can
now be excluded from his own house.
I.3 Resource Rights at Divorce
 How property, financial assets, and income are divided up at a divorce is a
large and complex part of family law. In Scotland, the Family Law (Scotland)
Act of 1985 sets out the principles by which this should be done. Before 1985,
financial provision at divorce was left mainly to the judges' discretion. My
intention here is not to give an account of the history of the law, but to identify
some important issues which have a bearing on the model of rights and
bargaining set out in this paper.
(i) Will one partner be compensated for any economic sacrifices they
have made during a marriage? An affirmative answer to this is one of the
central principles of the 1985 Act, the intention being to protect women who
have devoted time and effort to housekeeping and rearing children, and in
doing so have possibly given up a well paid job or damaged their future career
prospects.
(ii) Who will bear the cost of caring for dependent children of a
marriage? The 1985 Act lays down that this is to be shared equally between
the husband and wife, although the courts' jurisdiction has largely been
superseded by the Child Support Act of 1991, which gives powers to officers
of the Child Support Agency to make maintenance assessments.
(iii) What means are at a court's disposal for reallocating property and
income? In Scotland, a court can make awards of a capital sum, of periodical
allowances, and the transfer of property. It can set aside or vary the terms of
prenuptial settlements, transfer property or money to trustees, and make
orders regarding the division of benefits from life policies and pensions. In5
short, Scottish courts currently have a very wide range of powers, so that, as
Thomson has remarked, " [a] court can make orders for financial provision
which can be tailor-made for the particular couple concerned" (1996, p126).
The law concerning child custody defines another forms of right, which
might not fall within a narrow definition of property rights but which is certainly
important in determining the division of the pie at divorce, both because
resources have to be devoted to children, and because children can be
considered as 'assets' of the marriage i.e. as part of the pie itself. In England,
for example, before the Child Custody Act of 1839 a wife, even if separated,
had no custody or visiting rights. Since then the law has changed significantly.
Both in England and Scotland, custody law is now theoretically neutral
between husband and wife.
II. THE MODELLING FRAMEWORK
The previous section illustrated how property rights and family law have
changed dramatically in the United Kingdom over the last 150 years. Broadly
speaking, property rights have been transferred from men to women.
Historically this legal emancipation has been accompanied by profound
changes in the political and economic status of women. In order to isolate the
effect of legal changes on the incidence of divorce, I now set up a simple
model of property rights and marital dissolution.
I consider a husband and wife, living together as a married couple.
They may already have children. Following Dorothy Parker, we might think of
them as seven years into their marriage. Each has a certain earning capacity,
which may depend on their human capital, including their previous labour
market history. They have also accumulated physical and financial assets
such as real estate, bank accounts, stocks, and perhaps pensions rights.
II.1  Utility under Marriage and Divorce6
The combined resources of the couple define a utility possibility set, labelled
M, giving the feasible levels of utility that can be achieved through marriage.
Although the position of M does not depend on the disposition of marital
resource rights, to achieve some points in M may mean that one partner has
to give up rights, or at least not to enforce them, and perhaps to transfer
resources. Movements within M may involve not just changes in consumption
expenditure, but also changes in who goes out to work, who looks after any
children, who does the housework; all this will depend on the precise
specification of household members' tastes, resources, assets, and
employment opportunities.
 The combined resources of the couple also define a utility possibility
set, labelled D, giving the feasible levels of utility that can be achieved if the
couple divorce. Again, the position of D does not depend on resource rights
on divorce: it is a collection of possibilities. But it will be affected by any
opportunities that follow from divorce, for example the ability to find happiness
and wealth with another partner. It will also reflect the downside of divorce,
especially that arising from the splitting of the household, such as the loss of
economies of scale, and the reduced access to children suffered by one of the
parents.
I make a free disposal assumption about M and D that their boundaries
are their Pareto frontiers, denoted by BM and BD, which I also assume to be
continuous and nowhere positively sloped. I further assume that D and M are
not affected by the disposition, enforcement, or transfer of legal or resource
rights (in effect, there are no transaction costs).
II.2 Dissolution Rights, Outside Options, and Efficiency
To analyse the decision to dissolve a marriage I rely on two principles. Firstly,
I assume that dissolution rights define, for each partner, an outside option
which, once exercised, determines whether the couple will separate or stay
together. In the case of a unilateral dissolution law, the outside option is
divorce: either partner can, without the consent of the other, force a7
dissolution of the marriage. With a mutual consent law, either partner can
refuse to divorce and, without the consent of the other, force a continuation of
the marriage. For the outside option principle to have power, it is important
that exercising the option is irrevocable. This may seem a rather stark
assumption, since it appears to rule out reconciliation, or changing one's
mind. These are interesting problems, briefly considered in Section 4
The second principle is efficiency: no Pareto improvement is left
unexploited. In the absence of informational asymmetries and transaction
costs this assumption may seem quite mild, but it implies a collective
rationality by the couple even if, for example, one of them has been spurned
in favour of another lover.
If the outside option is exercised, the couple will reach an efficient
agreement on the allocation of resources, giving a utility pair denoted (in
obvious notation) either by m
* or d
*. The agreement they come to depends on
a number of things, but most importantly on property law.
1 Conditional on the
marital state, the law defines what each partner is entitled to. If marriage is
effectively a zero-sum game (so that there is no gain to cooperation within
marriage) the law on marital property defines directly the point m
* on the
Pareto frontier of M. If marriage is a positive-sum game, the law defines
entitlements (e.g. the right to one's own earnings) but the relationship
between such entitlements and the agreed point m
* on the Pareto frontier of M
depends on how couples reach agreement within marriage. A change in
marital property law changes these entitlements, and we can expect this to
change the agreement m
* to some other point BM. A similar argument applies
to the relationship between alimony law and the point d
* on BD when one
partner has exercised the right to unilateral divorce.
Consider now the situation prior to the exercise of any outside option.
With a dissolution law requiring mutual consent, there is no reason for one
partner, e.g. the wife, to agree to a divorce unless she gets at least mw
*, her
utility level if she refuses consent; similarly for the husband. Consequently
                                               
1  To use the phrase coined by Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979), the couple "bargain in
the shadow of the law".8
divorce will not occur if m
* ˇ D. If m
* ˛ D then divorce offers a potential Pareto
improvement over marriage. It might be that only the husband, say, gains by a
move to d
*; but if m
* ˛ D then by giving up post-divorce property rights he can
compensate his wife for consenting to the divorce yet remain better off than at
m
*. If there is a range of divorce allocations that make both partners better off
compared to m
* which of these is chosen requires further detail on how a
divorcing couple reach agreement. Nevertheless under a law requiring mutual
consent, divorce occurs if and only if m
* ˛ D.
With a dissolution law allowing unilateral divorce, a similar argument
applies. Whatever agreement the couple come to, the elements of d
* are the
minima that the wife and husband would accept. Therefore if d
* ˇ M the
marriage cannot be saved and the outcome is d
*. If d
* ˛ M, then although one
partner might benefit by a unilateral divorce, there will generally exist a range
of marital allocations that make both of them better off compared to d
*,
although further structure is required to specify which is chosen. Nevertheless,
under a unilateral law, divorce occurs if and only if d
* ˇ M.
The discussion so far may be summarised as follows:
__________________________________________________________________________
DIVORCE OCCURS OUTCOME IF OUTCOME IF
LAW IF AND ONLY IF DIVORCE NO DIVORCE
unilateral d
* ˇ M d
* m' where m’ > d
*
mutual consent m





This formulation enables us to be precise about the conditions under
which dissolution and property law matter. For arbitrarily given sets M and D
and points m
* and d
* the conditions d
* ˇ M and m
* ˛ D are not equivalent, and
neither necessarily implies the other. It is only in the special case in which M
is wholly contained within D or vice versa that the law does not matter. We9
can now interpret the claim of Becker and others that legal rules make no
difference to divorce rates. A result of Becker's model of the household is that
each partner's utility is positively related to their share of "commodity wealth",
an aggregate which may increase or decrease when the couple divorce.
Because commodity wealth is transferable between spouses at a rate of one-
for-one whether they are married or divorced, the two frontiers in utility space
cannot cross. Then the law on dissolution rights makes no difference to
whether the couple divorce, nor do the laws on marital property and divorce
settlements.
If M and D intersect, the outcome depends on both dissolution and
property law. Consider Figures 1 to 4. In Figure 1, the marriage survives
whatever the law on dissolution, and in Figure 4 divorce occurs, whatever the
law on dissolution. This isolates the potential importance of property law
(which determines the positions of m
* and d
*) in affecting divorce. Models that
explore this further are considered in Section 3. In Figures 2 and 3,
reminiscent of diagrams showing the Scitovsky paradox, dissolution law does
matter. In Figure 2 a move from mutual consent to a unilateral law changes
the outcome from marriage to divorce. In Figure 3, divorce occurs under
mutual consent, but with a more “liberal” unilateral law the marriage survives.
  III TWO STYLISED MODELS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Dissolution and property law matter if the sets M and D intersect. I now
present two stylised models with this characteristic. In Model 1 efficient
marriage involves cooperation. In Model 2 efficient divorce also involves
cooperation. To resolve the indeterminacy of how gains from cooperation are
distributed, I use a bargaining solution with minimal structure.
 Both models
use Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Details of mathematical workings are
given in the Appendix.
III.2 Model 1: who spends time at home?10
I assume that if the couple are married their utility functions are given by
u x x y i h w i h w i = + = ( ) , .
. . 0 5 0 5  Here, xi is i's output of some local public good
such as housework. I assume that one unit of housework takes one unit of
time. Partner i has an endowment of time, T, which can also be used to earn
money at a wage wi. Earned income can be used to buy the private good y at
a price p = 1. If the couple cooperate in marriage, we can think of earned
income being pooled, so that household activity satisfies
w x w x y y w T w T h h w w h w h w + + + = + . The frontier BM is generated by maximising
uh subject to a given level of uw, the pooled budget constraint
and 0 0 £ £ £ £ x T x T h w , . Then along BM, (uw)
2 + (uh)
2 = max{ww, wh} T
2.
To identify the point m
* (the outside option under mutual consent) I first
analyse the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative marriage game. If the
couple do not cooperate, they spend the money that they are entitled to, but
each takes no account of the effect that his/her production of the public good
has on the other. Partner i chooses xi and yi to maximise ui, subject
to 0 £ £ x T i  and w x y Y i i i i + = , given xj, whereY w T S i i i = + .The sums Sh and
Sw are transfers that reflect legal entitlements and obligations, so Sh + Sw = 0.
I assume any legal obligation is feasible, i.e. Yi > 0. Partner i's choices satisfy
xi = min [max [0, 
1/2 ( (Yi/wi) - xj) ], T ] and the budget constraint yi = Yi - wixi.
Similarly for partner j. The Nash equilibrium uniquely solves these four
equations and the resulting utility pair achieved is denoted by m
0 .
I now assume that the point m
* depends on m
0 in a simple way: I posit
a vector-valued function m
* =f(m
0, M) such that (i) m




and (iii) the matrix of first derivatives, ¶f/¶m
0, always has positive diagonal
elements and negative off-diagonal elements. The first condition repeats the
principle of Pareto efficiency; the second is one of individual rationality - no
agreement can make anyone worse off than disagreement; the third condition
is a monotonicity requirement that if m
0 moves in favour of i then m
* moves in
favour of i and against j. One function satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) is the Nash
bargaining solution m
* =argmax m 5




w), so my approach is
consistent with that taken in Ulph (1988), Kanbur and Haddad (1994),12
assume that wh = 4, and ww = 1. To complete the model, assume that T = 12
and exp(e) = 1.5 Then the frontiers BM and BD are as shown in Figure 5.
For both marriage and divorce, let us now look at two possible stances
that the law might take on property rights. Firstly, the law might specify that
each partner is entitled to his or her own earned income, whatever the marital
state. Then Sw = Sh = Aw = Ah = 0, and whether married or divorced the wife is
entitled to a full income (wwT) of 12, and the husband to a full income (whT) of
48, the value of their respective time endowments. This generates the ordered
pair (uw, uh) = (8, 16), labelled a in Figure 5, if the couple play a non-
cooperative game within marriage, and the pair b = (9, 18) if they divorce; thus
m
0 = a and d
*
 = b. The point m




* ˇ D; but d
* ˛ M.
Hence the marriage survives whatever the law on dissolution. Alternatively,
marital and alimony law might both specify that the wife is entitled to be
compensated for her loss of earning potential and to be rewarded for the
contribution she has made to any increase in her husband's earnings.
Suppose this entitles the wife to an equal share of their joint full income of 60,
implying a value of 18 for Sw and Aw, and of -18 for Sh and Ah. This generates
the point c = (14.70, 18.97) if the couple play a non-cooperative game within
marriage, and the point d = (22.05, 11.25) if they divorce.
3 Now m
* ˇ D and d
*
ˇ M, so the marriage survives only if divorce requires mutual consent.
However, it can readily be seen that further increases in Sw would
eventually place m
* inside the set D. This hints at a deeper message in Figure
5. If the husband's utility is zero, the wife would prefer divorce (uw = 36) over
marriage (uw = 24). In this sense divorce favours the wife; similarly marriage
favours the husband. The underlying reason is that after a divorce the
husband has a much higher opportunity cost of acquiring the good x; he must
give up time at work, and suffers a greater loss of earnings. Consequently in
situations where an important issue is who spends time at home, divorce is
                                               
3  Note that at c the outcome is efficient. Also, both parties are better off at c than at a.
This reflects an aspect of public good games with differing production costs that has been
noticed by a number of writers, especially Buchholz and Konrad (1995). It implies that a
change in the law that increases the transfer to the wife does not necessarily benefit her.13
more likely if the relevant property law (marital property law under mutual
consent, alimony law under unilateral divorce) moves in favour of the partner
with the lower wage rate.
III.3 Model 2: who gets child custody?
In this section I modify Model 1 so that it becomes a special case of a model
of child custody due to Weiss and Willis (1985). The public good is now
expenditure on a single child, which benefits both parents. In a marriage,
cooperative or not, the child lives with both parents, and either parent can
spend on the child. After a divorce, child expenditure is still a (local) public
goods, but the couple live separately. One parent has custody (e.g. the
mother), and only she spends on the child. I assume that it is impossible for
the father to monitor this expenditure, and so there is no mechanism whereby
the mother can internalise the impact of her child expenditures on the father.
Hence BD is constrained rather than fully efficient, the constraint being one of
behavioural feasibility, not resources.
The utility functions in marriage are as in Model 1, xi now being i's
expenditure on the child. There is no decision about housework and labour
supply, and i's earned income is exogenously given as wiT. Child and adult
consumption have a common price of 1, so a cooperative marriage has a
pooled budget constraint of  x x y y w T w T h w h w h w + + + = + . Then along BM, (uw)
2
+ (uh)
2 = (0.5(ww + wh)T)
2.
 As in Model 1, the disagreement point in marriage is
the Nash equilibrium of a game in which i chooses xi and yi, given xj and Yi =
wiT + Si (earned income, plus any transfers as defined by marital property
law). Partner i's choices satisfy xi = max [0, 
1/2(Yi - xj)] and the budget
constraint yi = Yi - wixi. Similarly for partner j. In this model the Nash
equilibrium, m
0, has the property, characteristic of models of private provision
of a public good with identical opportunity costs, that as long as each partner
spends something on the child then their individual consumption levels and
the total expenditure on the child are invariant to the distribution of total14
income wwT + whT.
4 The locus of all possible non-cooperative equilibria is
symmetric around the 45
0 line, but unless Yw and Yh are very unequal the
point m
0  will be on the 45
0
 line.
5 Given that M is symmetric this limits how
different the elements of m
* can be.
If the couple divorce, there are two effects. As before, there is a shock
to the utility functions.
6 But only the parent with custody of the child makes
child expenditures, even though both parents continue to benefit. If i has
custody, u x y i i i = ( )
. . 0 5 0 5 exp(e) which is maximised subject to xi + yi = Yi
', where
Yi
' = wiT + Ai. The non-custodial parent, j, spends total income Yj
' on yj and
gets utility u x y j i j = ( )
. . 0 5 0 5 exp(e). The frontier relating uw and uh when i has
custody, denoted by Ci, is given by (uj)
2 = ui((wi + wj)Texp(e) - 2ui ). The
feasible set bounded by Ci I label Di.
Despite any inability to enforce agreements about child expenditure,
there is still room for cooperation after divorce. Legal rights assign custody
and alimony, isolating a point on Cw or Ch which we can identify as d
0, the
divorce disagreement point. But if the custodial parent, i, has a low total
income, wiT + Ai, then d
0 is in the interior of Dj. A cooperative divorce would
involve an agreement to transfer custody to j and adjust alimony. Then BD is
the outer envelope of Cw and Ch and D is the union of Di and Dj.
As in Model 1, M is convex and symmetric around the 45
0
 line. D is the
union of two intersecting convex sets and is thus not convex; but even if ww
and wh differ, D is symmetric around the 45
0
 line. This is because the wage
rates (the only way in which the husband and wife might differ) only enter the
model via the terms w T w  andw T h , the sum of which is redistributed by the
divorce settlement. In particular, wi is not i's post-divorce opportunity cost of
the public good, as in Model 1. It can be shown that (i) if e < 0 D lies within M,
                                               
4  For a general analysis of the invariance property, see Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
(1986).
5  With the current parameterisation, m
0 will be on the 45
0
 line if 0.5Yh < Yw < 2Yh.
6  However there is no loss of utility from loss of custody per se.15
so the marriage will survive, regardless of the law; (ii) if e > loge(3/G8) M lies
within D, so divorce occurs, regardless of the law; (iii) if 0 < e < loge(3/G8) that
M and D intersect twice. In case (iii), BM lies beyond BD in the neighbourhood
of the 45
0
 line. Figure 6 illustrates. The implications of this are that under a
dissolution law requiring mutual consent, if marital property law, through its
effect on m
0, brings about approximate equality in the elements of m
* then m
*
ˇ D and the marriage will survive. Under a unilateral dissolution law the
marriage survives if d
* ˛ M; this requires that the law on alimony and custody
combine to bring about approximate equality in the elements d
*. The point
where Cw and Ch intersect is exactly on the 45
0 line, so d
* ˛ M can be
achieved by approximate equality in the elements of d
0. With equal wage
rates this requires that the parent with custody receive alimony (to pay for
child expenditures); but a custodial spouse with a lower wage should be
compensated with higher alimony; a non-custodial spouse with a lower wage
should be compensated by paying less alimony.
7 The law can place d
0 well
away from the 45
0 line, and hence increase the likelihood of divorce, if it
grossly favours one partner, perhaps by excessive or insufficient
compensation for prior economic sacrifices. Alternatively, the custodial parent
might receive excessive or insufficient child maintenance. If, for whatever
reason, d
* ˇ M, then the favoured partner cannot be dissuaded from seeking
a divorce, and in an efficient divorce settlement will retain or gain custody. To
put this another way, where custody is the central economic issue in a
marriage, a trend in the law to awarding more equitable divorce settlements
will reduce the likelihood of divorce
IV CONCLUSION
This paper analyses how dissolution law and property law interact to
determine divorce incidence. In addition to assuming that legal rights can be
costlessly enforced and transferred, the paper relies on a limited number of
                                               
7  With the current parameterisation, if i has custody, d
0 is on the 45
0 line if Ai =
(2wj - wi)T/3. This implies wiT + Ai = 2(wjT + Aj)16
simplifying principles: (i) that dissolution rights define an outside option; (ii)
that the final allocation is Pareto efficient; (iii) that neither partner will not
agree to a settlement (within marriage or after a divorce) that gives him or her
less than in the outside option; (iv) that what a partner gets in any agreed
settlement is positively related to what he or she can get by refusing to agree.
As in all models, these results are more or less sensitive to variations in
the assumptions. In particular, the outside option principle appears to go
against the spirit of recent legislation in the UK (the Family Law Act 1996)
which seeks to help couples draw back from the brink of divorce. One way in
which this could be included is to allow bargaining not over either the set M or
D, but over their union. Exercising the right to divorce unilaterally might then
be modelled by a switch of disagreement point from m
0 to d
0. One difficulty
with this is that in general the union of M or D will not be convex, so even the
use of the Nash Bargaining solution is problematic.
8 This is an interesting area
for future research, although early work suggests that it qualifies rather than
reverses the main conclusions.
Nevertheless, these principles take the analysis a long way: I show that
in general both dissolution rights and property rights are important in affecting
whether people divorce, with the consequent policy implication that divorce
reform and property law reform must be considered together. If the law on
dissolution changes from one of mutual consent to unilateral divorce, then it is
essential also to reform or update the law on the post-divorce division of
property. Otherwise, spouses who are disadvantaged by an unreformed
property law may suffer, either within their marriage or after a divorce, in a
way unintended by legislators. Even if the couple remain married, the option
of divorce might affect the way they conduct their marriage. Hence an
important side effect of changes in alimony law that improve the lot of
                                               
8  The standard approach to a non-convex feasible set is to recognise that the payoffs
are von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utilities. Consequently, a lottery over any pair of
feasible points is itself feasible, so we should consider the convex hull of the union of M and
D. This implies that that a couple will throw dice in order to decide whether to divorce or not! A
number of authors have proposed solutions to non-convex problems which do not permit
convexification; for example, Conley and Wilkie (1996), Herrero (1989), Kaneko (1980), Zhou
(1996).17




1. The equation for BM
The frontier BM can be generated by varying l in the problem: choose xh, xw, yh and yw to
maximise
(1) W = uh 
luw




subject to whxh + wwxw + yh +  yw = (wh + ww)T, 0 < xh  < T, 0 < xw  < T, yh > 0, yw > 0. Suppose,
as in the numerical examples in the paper, wh > ww. Then clearly for efficiency
 xh = 0 if  xw < T and xh > 0 only if  xw  = T.
Suppose xh = 0 and consider the first order condition for xw. Satisfied as an equality it yields
xw = 
1/2(wh + ww)T/ww.
Since wh > ww, the R.H.S. is greater than T. Hence xw < T cannot be optimal. Suppose now xw
= T, and consider the first order condition for xh. Satisfied as an equality it yields
xh = 
1/2(wh + ww)T/wh - T.
Since wh > ww, the R.H.S. is negative so xh > 0 cannot be optimal. Thus any solution to (1)
must have xw = T and xh = 0. If we now consider the simplified problem: choose yh and yw to
maximise
(2) W = uh 
luw




subject to yh +  yw = whT, then yh = lwhT yw = (1-l)whT. Together with xw = T and xh = 0, this
yields  uh = T
0.5(lwhT)




2  + (uw)
2 = whT
2.
A similar result holds if ww > wh. If wh = ww then a simple variant of the argument shows xh +
xw = T is optimal. Thus21
(uh)
2  + (uh)
2 = max{wh, ww}T
2.
N.B. This rather neat result depends on the private and public goods having equal weight in
the utility functions.
2. Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative marriage
Partner i chooses xi and yi to maximise ui = (xi + xJ)
0.5yi
0.5 given xj and subject to wixi + yi = wiT
+Si (= Yi), 0 < xi < T, yi > 0. Substituting the budget constraint into the maximand generates a
first order condition for xi which satisfied as an equality yields
(3) xi = 
1/2(Yi/wi - xj)
The R.H.S. of (3) might be negative for high xj or for negative Si (partner i has to work all the
time to support partner j). Similarly the R.H.S. of (3) might be greater than T. Hence the
optimal choices are: xi = min [max [0, 
1/2 ( (Yi/wi) - xj) ], T ] and yi = Yi - wixi. Similarly xj = min
[max [0, 
1/2 ( (Yj /wj - xi) ], T ] and yj = Yj - wjxj.
The two equations for xi and xj can be considered as reaction functions xi = xi(xj) and
xj = xj(xi). They are both continuous, non-increasing, bounded below by 0 and above by T,
and with slopes, where defined, less than one in absolute value. Hence they have a unique
solution (giving a unique Nash equilibrium) in the non-negative quadrant. Note that xi = xj = 0
can be ruled out since Yi  + Yj = (wi + wj)T > 0. If Si = - Sj = 0, then xi + xj = 
2/3T, which is less
than the efficient level of T (see the analysis of BM above). At this point, d(xi + xj)/dSi = 
1/3(1/wi
- 1/wj), so a transfer to the partner with the strictly lower wage increases (xi + xj), but it will
never be greater than T.
3. The equations for BD
Partner i chooses xi and yi to maximise ui = xi 
0.5yi
0.5exp(e) subject to wixi + yi = wiT +Ai, 0 < xh
< T, yi > 0. If Ai  < wiT then xi  < T (i  works), and ui = 
1/2(T +  Ai/wi)wi
0.5exp(e). If Ai  > wiT then xi
= T and ui = (TAi)
0.5exp(e). Suppose wh > ww. Then the asumption that legal obligations are
fesasible, wwT +Aw > 0, implies Ah < whT. Thus
uh = 
1/2(T +  Ah/wh)wh
0.5exp(e)
1/2(T +  Aw/ww)ww
0.5exp(e)   if Aw < wwT
   uw =
(TAw)
0.5exp(e)      if Aw > wwT.22








2  if Aw > wwT.
4. The numerical example in Figure 5
We take wh = 4, ww = 1, T = 12, exp(e) = 1.5. Along BM, (uw)
2 + (uh)
2 = 576. The equations for
xh and xw in a non-cooperative marriage are:
xh = min [max [0, 6 + Sh/8 - xw/2 ], 12]:
xw = min [max [0, 6 +Sw/2 - xh/2 ], 12 ].
Along BD
2uh + uw = 45 if Aw < 12,
72uh + uw
2 = 1296 if Aw > 12.
If Sw = Sh = 0, then in a noncooperative marriage xw = xh = 4 solves the reaction functions
above, with yw = 8 and yh = 32, giving the point a, (uw, uh) = (8, 16), which is within the frontier
(uw)
2 + (uh)
2 = 576. If Aw = Ah = 0, then after divorce we get the point b = (9, 18), again within
the frontier BM.
If Sw =  - Sh = 18, then in a noncooperative marriage xw = 12 and xh = 0 solves the
reaction functions, with yw = 18 and yh = 320 giving the point c = (14.70, 18.97), which is on
the frontier (uw)
2 + (uh)
2 = 576. If Aw = -Ah = 18, then after divorce xw = 12, xh = 3.75, yw = 18,
yh = 15, giving the point d = (22.05, 11.25), outside the frontier BM.23
MODEL 2
5. The equation for BM
The frontier BM can be generated by varying l in the problem: choose xh, xw, yh and yw to
maximise
W = uh 
luw




subject to xh + xw + yh +  yw = (wh + ww)T, xh >  0, xw >  0, yh > 0,  yw > 0. This yields total child
expenditure xh + xw of 













6. Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative marriage
Partner i chooses xi and yi to maximise ui = (xi + xJ)
0.5yi
0.5 given xj and subject to xi + yi = wiT
+Si (= Yi), xi  > 0, yi > 0. This problem is the same as that in Section 2 above, but without an
upper bound on xi. Thus xi = max [0, 
1/2(Yi - xj)] and yi = Yi - xi. Similarly xj = max [0, 
1/2(Yj  - xi)]
and yj = Yj - xj.
The reaction functions xi = xi(xj) and xj = xj(xi) are both continuous, non-increasing,
bounded below by 0, and with slopes, where defined, less than one in absolute value. Hence
they have a unique solution (giving a unique Nash equilibrium) in the non-negative quadrant.
Note that the reaction functions have the same functional form, so that the locus of all
possible Nash equilibria, generated by varying the division of  (wi + wj)T, is symmetric (in
utility space) around the 45
0 line. Note that xi = xj = 0 can be ruled out since Yi  + Yj = (wi +
wj)T > 0. If we ignore the non-negativity constraint in the reaction functions we get xi = 
2/3Yi -
1/3Yj and xj = 
2/3Yj - 
1/3Yi, implying that if Yi > 2Yj then  xj  = 0 and if Yj > 2Yi then  xi  = 0. But if
both xj and xi are positive then xi + xj = 
1/3(wh + ww)T, which is less than the efficient level of T
(see the analysis of BM above). At this point, d(xi + xj)/dSi = 0, so a marginal transfer between
partners, whatever their respective wages, has no effect on total child expenditure, nor on
either partner's private expenditure.
7. The equations for Cw, Ch, and  BD24
If i has custody, u x y i i i = ( )
. . 0 5 0 5 exp(e) which is maximised subject to xi + yi = wiT + Ai. Thus
ui = 
1/2(wiT + Ai)exp(e).
The non-custodial parent spends total income wjT + Aj
 on yj and so gets




Putting Ai = - Aj  we get a relationship between uw and uh when i has custody, denoted by Ci,
given by
(uj)
2 = ui((wi + wj)Texp(e) - 2ui ).
This gives the the frontier Ci. Clearly, as ui inceases from zero, uj increases from zero, and
then decreases. Setting ui = uj gives a quadratic equation with solutions at zero and (wi +
wj)Texp(e)/3, so on Ci, uj > ui  if ui < (wi + wj)Texp(e)/3. Since Ci and Cj  are reflections of each
other around the 45
0 line, this implies that the intersection of the two sets with respective
frontiers Ci and Cj  is non-empy. It also implies that if i has custody and ui is less than (wi +
wj)Texp(e)/3 then the point on Ci is in the interior of D, the union of  the sets with frontiers Ci
and Cj  i.e. there is a potential Pareto improvment to be had by transferring custody. A
custodial parent i has utility less than (wiT + Ai)Texp(e)/3 if Ai is less than (2wj - wi)T/3. If this
is so, then wiT + Ai  is less than 2(wjT - Ai). In other words, in an efficient divorce the custodial
parent will have an overall income at least twice that of the other parent. This line of argument
also justifies the statement in Footnote 7.
8 The intersection of M and D
To determine whether M and D intersect, or whether one lies wholly within the other, consider
the equations for BM and Ci :
(uj)




2 = 2ui(zexp(e) - ui ).
where  z = 
1/2(wi + wj)T.25
If we treat these as simultaneous equations and solve we find that if exp(e) < 1, these
have no real solutions. If exp(e) = 1, these is a unique solution ui = z, uj = 0, but all other
points on  Ci lie within M.
If 1 < exp(e) < 3/G8 there is a single real solution in the positive quadrant, with ui  greater than
uj. Given the symmetry of Ci and Cj this point must be on the frontier BD. There is a second
point where Cj and BM intersect. Between these two intersections, points on both Ci and Cj lie
within M.
  If exp(e) = 3/G8, ui = uj = z/G2, so the intersection of Ci and Cj just lies on BM, but
elsewhere points on the outer envelope of Ci and Cj lie beyond it. If exp(e) > 3/G8, then at the
intersection of BM and Ci  ui  is less than uj, and all points on the outer envelope of Ci and Cj
lie beyond  BM.26
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